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Reforming Global Economic Governance: A Strategy for Middle Powers in the G201
Daniel D. Bradlow2
Paper prepared for the workshop on “Going Global:
Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea and South Africa in International Affairs”
Jakarta, Indonesia, May 25-26, 20103
I. Introduction
In this paper I argue that middle powers that are members of the G20 can extract substantial
benefit from their participation in the G20 if they have both a clear long term vision of global
economic governance and a plan of action that is based on obtainable short term objectives.
To establish this proposition, I will address four issues. The first is that the institutional
arrangements for global economic governance will remain unstable until the current process of
changes in the balance of global political and economic power plays itself out. The second is
that, given the changing international power dynamics, the current “manager” of the global
economy, the G20, is unlikely to be a stable entity. Consequently it can only be effective if it
focuses on the relatively narrow range of economic issues of common interest to all G20
members. Third, middle-size countries need a long term vision of global financial governance to
guide their conduct in the G20 and other forums of global governance. Fourth, the middle
powers will only be able to capitalize on whatever short term opportunities may arise from their
participation in the G20 if they identify a set of achievable short term objectives and devise a
strategy for reaching them.
II. State of Transition in Geo-Political Power
The recent financial crisis demonstrated that the G74 countries are no longer able to function as
the pre-eminent forum for global economic governance. These countries have been forced to
recognize that they need the other G20 countries to effectively manage the global economic and
financial system. Consequently, they elevated the G20, which had previously been only a
gathering of finance ministers and central bankers, to the level of a meeting of heads of state.
This has two important consequences. First, it is resulting in pressure to expand the agenda of the
G20 beyond its prior relatively narrow focus on financial and monetary affairs, which could
undermine its effectiveness. Second, it is converting the G20 into potentially the most important
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international forum for the management of the global economy, even though it lacks stable
membership5, a permanent secretariat and a formal legal existence.
The shift in power away from the G7 countries should not be over-stated. While these countries
have accepted the G20’s pre-eminence in economic matters, they have not surrendered their
control over the global economic agenda, which is dominated by the regulatory and governance
issues of most interest to them. The shifting balance of power merely means that the rising
powers in the G20 can participate in the discussions on these agenda items and can influence
their prioritization. They do not appear able, however, to persuade the G20 to take decisions that
the G7 oppose.6
The current situation, therefore, must be seen as being a time of transition, in which the leading
states in the G7 seem to be loosing power relative to some of the larger and more influential
developing countries in the G20. This shift in the balance of relative power has only advanced
far enough to deprive the G7 of their previous dominance. The rising powers however have not
gained sufficient power to have either the will or the ability to take over leadership of the global
economic system. The result is an unstable situation in which the institutional arrangements for
global governance are likely to remain provisional until the process of rebalancing global power
has played itself out and the relative positions of the new and old powers are clarified.
There are some inevitable consequences that follow from our current position in the rebalancing
process. First, we can only be confident that the G20, as currently constituted, will remain the
primary manager of global economic governance in the short-to-medium term. It is already
possible to see pressure to change its composition, as evidenced by the facts that additional
invitees, such as Spain and the Netherlands, have been included on an ad hoc basis in the G20
summits and that there is pressure to expand its agenda beyond financial and economic issues to
include such issues as climate change and development.
Second, the efforts to reform the current institutional arrangements for global economic
governance are likely to be partial, unsatisfactory and unsustainable. This suggests that, while
limited reforms are possible, their can be no definitive resolution of the debates about the
mandates and the governance of the existing international financial institutions. Similarly, there
is unlikely to be a final determination about whether the Financial Stability Board should be
merely a forum of discussion and coordination among regulators or, for example using its
proposed peer review mechanism, should play a more active role in global economic
governance. Also unlikely to be resolved is the appropriate role, procedures, and power of bodies
like the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors (BCBS), the International Organizations of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS).
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Third, the institutional relationships between the G20, global institutions like the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group, and sub-global groupings of states, whether based
on regional or other criteria, cannot be effectively resolved until the over-arching global power
relations are clarified. However, it is important to note that the resulting uncertainty can create
opportunities for these sub-global groups to help shape the future global order into one that is
more open to effective participation by all participants.
III. Short Term Agenda
During the current process of power rebalancing the range of issues on which meaningful and
sustainable results are obtainable is likely to be narrow and limited to tinkering with the existing
arrangements. This can be seen, for example, in the limited agreements reached on reforming the
governance of the IMF and the World Bank, despite the general agreement on the need for
change in their decision making procedures and their mandates. The changes that have been
agreed and, in some cases actually implemented, have not substantially altered the real power
arrangements in these institutions. For example, the recently announced change in World Bank
voting, once implemented, will merely increase the vote for developing and transitional countries
from about 44% of total to 47% of total and it will not affect either the US veto or the ability of
the EU member states to block decisions that they strongly oppose. Similarly, the promised
change in the procedures for selecting the leader of the World Bank and the IMF is unlikely to
significantly change the functioning of these organizations. As the example of the United
Nations shows, those states with vetoes are able to dominate an institution even if its head is not
one of their nationals.
The current international efforts to reform global financial regulation are similarly constrained.
The items at the top of the global regulatory reform agenda -- capital adequacy, liquidity, hedge
funds, derivatives, executive bonuses, bank taxes to recoup the costs of earlier bank bailouts—
are all items of most interest to G7 countries. There appears to be no space on the international
agenda for such issues as expanding access to the financial system, an important issue for
African countries and others in the developing world, reinvestment of capital flight back into the
developing countries, using regulatory incentives to encourage greater attention to development
issues or broadening participation in the decision making procedures of the BCBS, IOSCO and
the IAIS.
IV. A Long Term Vision of Global Governance
As discussed above, the middle powers can only effectively exploit the limited opportunities
arising from their participation in the G20 if they base their actions in the G20 on a long term
vision of global economic governance. This vision should be based on the following five factors.
A. A Holistic Vision of Development
All states are developing states in the sense that they are striving to create better lives for their
citizens. While states may differ in defining their responsibilities in this regard and on which
aspects of the development process they wish to prioritize, they all agree that the well-being of
both individuals and societies can be positively or negatively affected by a range of economic
3

and non-economic factors. Thus they all see development as a comprehensive and holistic
process in which the economic aspects cannot be separated from the social, political,
environmental, and cultural aspects, all of which are integrated into one dynamically integrated
process. 7
The extent to which the global governance arrangements incorporate this holistic vision of
development will influence how effectively they help all states achieve their developmental
objectives.
B. Comprehensive coverage
Comprehensive coverage means that the mechanisms and institutions of international economic
governance should be applicable to all stakeholders in the international economy. For example,
the mechanisms of international financial governance must be incorporate the activities and
operations of financial intermediaries that engage in sophisticated national and cross border
financial transactions and their clients, savers and investors who wish to base their financial
transactions on religious principles, as well as small financial institutions that operate only in
local markets, and micro-financial institutions.
There are three important corollaries that follow from the principle of comprehensive coverage.
First, the mechanisms of international economic governance must be sufficiently flexible and
dynamic that they can adapt to the changing needs and activities of their diverse stakeholders.
Second, the totality of international economic governance arrangements must ensure that the
international community receives all the services it requires from a well functioning global
economic system. The third corollary, which is intended to ensure that the governance
arrangements are flexible, efficient and not unduly centralized, is the principle of subsidiarity.8
This principle holds that all decisions should be taken at the lowest level in the system
compatible with effective decision making. It is a complicated principle to implement because it
must apply both in standard operating conditions and in crisis situations, which may require that
decisions are made at a different level than is the case during standard conditions. In addition, it
needs to be linked to a conflict resolution mechanism that is capable of resolving disputes
between regulators at different levels as to which level is the most appropriate for resolving a
particular issue
C. Respect for applicable international law
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The institution arrangements for international economic governance, either because they are
formal international organizations created by treaty or involve decision making by sovereign
states, should comply with applicable international legal principles. In particular, this means that
the decision-making bodies and institutions engaged in international economic governance
should conform to universally applicable customary and treaty based international legal
principles. There are four sets of principles that are applicable in this regard.
The first is the principle of respect for national sovereignty. It is clear that by participating in a
global governance arrangement, states are agreeing to forego some level of sovereignty in order
to reap the benefits of a well-functioning international system. Given the different power and
wealth characteristics of the participating states, it follows that, de facto, the amount of
independence they give up will be positively related to their power and wealth. However, the
principle of national sovereignty should still provide them with the means for preserving as much
independence and policy space as is practicable and consistent with the demands of effective
global financial governance.
The second is the general principle of non- discrimination. This means that the institutions of
international economic governance should treat all similarly situated states and individuals in the
same way. This inevitably means that there will be disparate treatment for differently situated
states and individuals. The key question thus becomes what standards can be used to ensure that
all stakeholders receive treatment that is fair and reasonable.
In the case of sovereign states, this means that, while the institutions of global governance should
base their treatment of all states on the same principles, they should apply these principles in a
way that is responsive to the different situations of each member state. One way of implementing
this approach could be to apply the general principle of special and differential treatment that is
applicable in a number of international legal contexts -- for example international environmental
and international trade law -- to international economic governance. This could result in special
consideration being given to weak and poor states so that they are able to enjoy a meaningful
level of participation in international economic decision making structures, even when they are
based on principles like weighted voting. A consequence to this may be that the organization
offers some mechanism of accountability to these states and their citizens to compensate for any
participation deficit.
In the case of non-state stakeholders in global economic governance, the relevant principles
should be derived from documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which many
now consider to be part of customary international law9. Thus, one indicator of good economic
governance could be the level of respect that the institutions of international financial
governance show for human rights in their member countries.
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The third set of international legal principles applicable to international economic governance
deals with the responsibility of states for the functioning of the global economic system. Based
on general principles of state responsibility10, they have an obligation to provide foreign legal
persons, which are present in the state, either through an investment or an individual transaction,
with fair and non-discriminatory treatment. This means that these foreign entities should receive
comparable treatment to similarly situated domestic institutions.
A fourth set of applicable international legal principles are derived from international
environmental law11. At a minimum these principles would impose on regulators an obligation to
insist that all financial institutions and other economic actors fully understand the environmental
and social impacts of their practices and of individual transactions.
D. Coordinated specialization
The principle of coordinated specialization acknowledges that, even though development is
holistic and all aspects of international governance are inter-connected, international economic
governance cannot function efficiently without a limited and specialized mandate. Thus, the
principle of coordinated specialization has two requirements. First, the mandate of the
mechanisms and institutions of international economic governance must be clearly defined and
limited to international economic affairs. Second, these institutions cannot ignore the other
important aspects of the development process. Consequently, there is a need to ensure some form
of coordination between the institutions and mechanisms of international economic governance
and other organizations and arrangements for global governance. The coordinating mechanism,
if it is to effectively resolve tensions between the different aspects of international governance,
needs to be transparent and predictable. It may also need some dispute settlement mechanism.
E. Good Administrative Practice
The basic principles of good administrative practice in global governance are the same as those
applicable to any public institution. These principles are transparency, predictability,
participation, reasoned decision making, and accountability. This means that all the institutions
involved in international economic governance must conduct their operations in a manner that is
sufficiently open that their procedures, decisions, and actions are predictable and understandable
to all stakeholders. They must also offer these stakeholders some meaningful way of raising their
concerns and having them addressed by the institutions. The institutions should also be required
to explain their decisions and operations to all interested stakeholders. Finally, the stakeholders
should be able to hold the institutions accountable for their decisions and actions.
V. Tactical Issues
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It is clear that there is neither general consensus on this long term vision nor on how to
implement it. Moreover, it is clear that in the current phase of the transitions in global power, it
is not possible to implement this vision. This suggests that during the current phase, middle
powers should have adopt a pragmatic, approach to global economic governance reform. In brief
they should concentrate on developing short term tactics that both result in real benefits for their
countries and their citizens and that open up further opportunities for achieving global economic
governance reforms that are consistent with their long term objectives.
Implementing this strategy requires both setting priorities for the short term and developing a
plan of action for achieving these objectives. For example, given that South Africa’s and Africa’s
concerns in the global financial arena are focused on questions of poverty and inequality, the
sorts of issues that South Africa should prioritize in the G20 are those that can enhance the
ability of Africa to address these issues. Given this general orientation, there are two issues in the
financial area, that offer suitable short term objectives. The first relates to financial regulation.
South Africa can call for broadening the scope of the banking regulatory reform agenda. In
particular, South Africa can point out that for many African countries a key issue is the fact that
many of their citizens and small companies do not have effective access to financial services.
They can add that regulation can help address this issue by encouraging banks to develop new
products that are specifically targeted at this problem. In this regard, it can also remind the rich
countries of Paul Volcker’s contention that the most important financial innovation of recent
years is the ATM because of its impact on enhancing convenience and access to financial
services. Africa could also remind the world that the next innovation of this sort might be cell
phone banking, in which Africa is a leader. Another regulatory issue that should be addressed is
the problem of how to get international banks to recycle at least a small proportion of the capital
flight that they attract from African and other developing countries back into these countries. A
third regulatory issue is incentivising the banks to extend some of their more impressive social
responsibility initiatives to other aspects of their business. A good example of such an initiative
is the Equator Principles12, which deal with the management of the social and environmental
risks in large project financings.
.
The second issue that South Africa and other that middle powers can prioritize is reform of the
governance arrangements of the IMF. It is becoming increasingly clear that, regardless of the
rhetoric about the need for substantial reform of the IMF’s governance, substantial reform is
unlikely to take place in the short term. Consequently, the most realistic reforms are those that
are possible within the existing legal framework. One reform that can easily be achieved within
this constraint is increasing the IMF’s public accountability. Unlike the World Bank and all the
other multilateral development banks, it does not have an independent accountability
mechanism. These mechanisms allow non-state actors, who claim that they have been harmed by
the failure of these organizations to comply with their own policies and procedures, to have their
claims investigated and reported to the Boards of these organizations. Their benefit to the
organization is that they increase the efficacy of the operations of these entities by both
enhancing compliance with their policies and procedures and by enabling the institution to gain
more detailed empirical knowledge about the actual impact of their operations. This improves
their ability to learn from their operations and to improve them. Another action that would
improve global financial governance and is relatively easy to implement is increased
12
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participation by developing countries in the appropriate decision making bodies of the
international regulatory authorities like the BCBS, IOSCO and the IAIS. This increased
participation should result in these bodies developing principles and policies that are more
sensitive to the needs of these countries and to impact of financial regulation on poverty and
inequality.
Finally, South Africa should combine this short term substantive vision with a plan of action that
seeks allies from both other middle powers, like Australia, Brazil, Indonesia and the Korea, as
well as other G20 members including, if appropriate, the G7 countries.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that participation in the G20 offers middle powers like South Africa
an opportunity to influence the global economic agenda and the institutional arrangements for
global governance. However, given the current configuration of geo-political forces and the
process of change they are undergoing this opportunity is limited both in terms of the scope of
issues that can be addressed and in terms of the benefits that can be obtained on each issue.
Moreover, in order to maximize the benefits that the middle powers can gain from this
opportunity, they need to have a long term vision of the forms of international economic
governance that they are seeking and to derive their short term objectives and implementation
strategy from this vision.
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